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THE NONPROLIFERATION MANDATE AND THE
APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD IN HEALTH
CARE BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATIONS
I. Introduction
In 1974, Congress enacted amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act)' which extended its coverage to employees of
nonprofit health care institutions.2 The most controversial and liti-
1. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The Act seeks to avoid industrial strife which
interferes with the free flow of commerce "by encouraging the practice ... of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choos-
ing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ
ment .. " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Act has undergone significant changes since
its original enactment in 1935. The amendments prior to 1974 which comprise the
Act include: The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub.
L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-183, 185-187
(1976)) (shifted focus from employee rights to a more balanced federal labor policy
by imposing restrictions on unions and granting certain freedoms of speech and
conduct to employers and individual employees) and The Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519, (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-402, 411-415, 431-441, 461-466, 481-483,
501-504, 521-531 (1976)) (standardized internal administrative practices and proce-
dures of unions and guaranteed members full access to information disclosed under
the reporting requirements). The jurisdiction of the Act extends to all cases involving
enterprises whose operations "affect commerce." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6), (7),
159(c), 160(a) (1976). The constitutional coverage of the Act over activities that
"affect" interstate commerce has been enlarged since its initial promulgation. See
NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963) (a business itself does not have
to be in interstate commerce to affect commerce between the states); NLRB v.
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (interstate transportation of raw materials or finished
products is material in interstate commerce without regard to the relative amount or
volume of commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(intrastate activities such as manufacturing may have a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce).
2. Pub. L. No. 360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). One of the new amendments, § 213, is
an addition to the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 183 (Supp. III
1979). See notes 38-61 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments. The most significant amendments enacted in 1974
include: (1) extension of the Act's jurisdiction to include nonprofit health care institu-
tions, 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976); (2) special time periods for health care collective
bargaining, including: (a) 90-day notice to the other party of intent to terminate or
modify a collective bargaining agreement, id. § 158(d)(A) (Supp. 1979); (b) 60-day
notice of the termination or modification of a collective bargaining agreement to the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), id.; (c) 30-day notice to the
FMCS of initial contract bargaining, id. § 158(d)(B) (1976); (d) mandatory participa-
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gated area 3 of the new law has centered on the determination of
appropriate bargaining units. 4 Fearful of unchecked bargaining unit
growth in an industry which encompasses a complex array of job
levels and skills, Congress issued a mandate5 in 1974 directing the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board)6 to prevent unit prolifer-
tion by the health care institution and labor organization in mediation conducted by
the FMCS, id. § 158(d)(C); (e) 10-day notice to the health care institution by a labor
organization of concerted refusals to work, id. § 158(g).
3. See notes 73-196 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of conflicting
Board and circuit court decisions concerning bargaining units in the health care
industry.
4. Section 9(a) of the Act states that "[r]epresentatives designated ... for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit .... 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). The appropriate bargaining unit is
comprised of employees who have a substantial mutual interest in wages, hours and
other conditions of employment. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 201 (C. Morris ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as LABOR LAW 1971]. A unit determination "demarcates (1)
who will be permitted to vote in the representation election, and (2) the job title
grouping of employees who will be covered by the NLRB certification if the union
prevails at the election." Shepard, Health Care Institution Labor Law: Case Law
Developments, 1974-1978, 4 AM. J. L. & MEn. 1, 6 (1978).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974), reprinted in SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON LABOR, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D
SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 274-75 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 12. The National Labor Relations Board was directed
to give "due consideration" to the prevention of proliferation of bargaining units in
the health care industry. See text accompanying note 60 infra for the text of the
committee reports.
6. The National Labor Relations Board, established to administer and enforce
the Act, is comprised of five Members, each of whom is appointed to a five-year term
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(1976). Pursuant to § 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its decision making
authority in representation cases to Regional Directors. See id. § 153(b). The Board
has imposed discretionary limitations on the exercise of its powers to enforce the Act.
See id. § 164(1). It has created a set of "jurisdictional standards" which vary,
depending on the enterprise, and are based on a required annual dollar volume of
business. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES 1-16 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE]. The jurisdictional revenue require-
ments for privately operated health care institutions include: $250,000 annual busi-
ness volume for hospitals, Butte Medical Prop., 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967),
$100,000 for nursing homes, University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 264
(1967) (proprietary nursing home); Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1047
(1970) (nonprofit nursing home), and $250,000 for all other private health care
institutions defined in the Act, East Oakland Community Health Alliance, Inc., 218
N.L.R.B. 1270, 1271 (1975). See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 403-04, 414-15 (C.
Morris ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as LABOR LAW 1976].
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ation. Since then, differing interpretations of this congressional direc-
tive by the Board and the federal circuit courts7 have resulted in
almost unanimous court denials to enforce the Board's bargaining unit
decisions. 8
7. In unfair labor practice proceedings, see 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (lists unfair
labor practices), circuit courts review Board unit determinations. See id. § 160(f)
(grant of judicial review); note 115 infra and accompanying text.
8. Trustees of the Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626 (2d
Cir. 1983), granting enforcement to 261 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 110 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1982)
(Board order for service and maintenance unit); NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp.,
Inc., 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982), denying enforcement to 254 N.L.R.B. 36 (1981)
(Board order for registered nurse unit); Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center
v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1982), denying enforcement to 261 N.L.R.B. No. 39,
110 L.R.R.M. 1095 (1982) (Board order for single facility registered nurse unit);
NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, Inc., 67,8 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.
1982), denying enforcement to 238 N.L.R.B. 884 (1978) (Board order for registered
nurse unit excluding licensed vocational nurses); NLRB v. Foundation for Compre-
hensive Health Servs., 654 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (mem.), denying
enforcement to 251 N.L.R.B. 161 (1980) (Board order for professional unit excluding
social workers), on remand, 261 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 109 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1982); Beth
Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981), modified,
688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1982) (en bane), petition for cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 433
(1982), denying enforcement to No. 27-CA-6658 (NLRB Aug. 27, 1980) (Board order
for registered nurse unit); St. Anthony Hosp. Sys. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir.
1981), modified sub nom. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d
697 (10th Cir. 1982) (en bane), petition for cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982),
denying enforcement to 252 N.L.R.B. 50 (1980) (Board order for registered nurse
unit); Vicksburg Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), granting
enforcement to 251 N.L.R.B. 6 (1980) (Board order for service, maintenance and
technical unit); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th
Cir. 1981), modified by Beth Israel & Geriatric Center, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.
1982) (en banc), petition for cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982), denying enforce-
ment to No. 27-CA-6574-2 (NLRB Apr. 14, 1980) (Board order for registered nurse
unit); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980), denying
enforcement to 242 N.L.R.B. 440 (1979) (Board order for unit of four licensed
stationary engineers); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979),
denying enforcement to 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (1978) (Board order extending comity to a
state agency maintenance unit determination); NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606
F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 (1980), denying enforcement to
238 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1978) (Board order for maintenance unit); NLRB v. Sweetwater
Hosp. Ass'n, 604 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1979), granting enforcement to 219 N.L.R.B.
803 (1975) (Board order for technical unit); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404
(9th Cir. 1979), denying enforcement to 232 N.L.R.B. 32 (1977) (Board order for
registered nurse unit); NLRB v. Mercy Hosps., Inc., 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979), denying enforcement to 224 N.L.R.B. 419 (1976)
(Board refusal to honor stipulation for service-and-maintenance and all-clerical
unit); Bay Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979), granting enforcement to 231 N.L.R.B. 607 (1977)
(Board order for technical unit excluding licensed practical nurses with prior bar-
gaining history); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978),
denying enforcement to 224 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1976) (Board order for maintenance
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This Comment examines the ongoing controversy over the appro-
priate legal standard to be applied in the determination of bargaining
units in the health care industry. It reviews the basic law which
governs the selection of appropriate units,9 discusses the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments as they relate to bargaining units,' 0
and considers the intent of the accompanying admonition against unit
proliferation. I I Implementation of the congressional mandate is exam-
ined in Board unit determinations.12 The Board's persistent use of the
traditional industrial community of interest test 13 is examined in light
of circuit court decisions which have advocated new approaches.
This Comment concludes that the new "disparity of interest test"14
is more consistent with the congressional mandate to avoid unit prolif-
eration in the health care industry and argues that the Board should
abandon its sole reliance on traditional criteria in favor of this more
responsive approach.
II. Criteria for Board Unit Determinations
Congress empowered the Board with the exclusive authority to
determine the "unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing." '15 In making these determinations, the Board seeks to fulfill a
unit); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), denying enforce-
ment to 238 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1978) (Board order for unit of boiler operators); Long
Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
996 (1978), denying enforcement to 228 N.L.R.B. 83 (1977) (Board order extending
comity to a 13-year old state agency maintenance and engineering unit determina-
tion); Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976), denying enforcement
to 220 N.L.R.B. 402 (1975) (Board order extending comity to state agency mainte-
nance unit determination).
9. See notes 15-37 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 38-60 infra and accompanying text.
11. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 62-114 infra and accompanying text.
13. The community of interest test is a multi-factor criterion utilized by the
Board in its industrial unit determinations. See AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 6, at 131. Because the designated unit must function for the mutual
benefit of all employees, see J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND
THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 245 (1981) [hereinafter cited as APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT], the Board weighs such factors as similarities in skills, duties,
working conditions, the nature of the employer's organization, bargaining history,
the desires of the employees, and the extent of union organization in rendering unit
determinations. AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 132-40. See
notes 27-37 infra.
14. The disparity of interest test focuses on employee dissimilarity and encour-
ages broader unit determinations. See notes 128-60 infra and accompanying text.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). See South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800, 804 (1975) (Board has exclusive jurisdiction
to make unit determinations).
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double objective: (1) assure maximum freedom'" so that employees
may exercise the rights guaranteed to them by the Act,' 7 and (2)
promote harmonious labor relations through the process of collective
bargaining.' 8 Because the size and composition of bargaining units
bear importantly on both pre-election strategy' and on the post-
election bargaining relationship, 20 the parties often disagree over the
make-up of the unit. 21 When the parties cannot voluntarily agree, the
Board exercises its statutory powers22 and defines the appropriate
unit. 23
16. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
17. Section 7 of the Act confers upon employees "the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . I..." d  § 157; see id.
§ 158(d) (defines "to bargain collectively"); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
483, 507 (1978) (hospital employees are entitled to self-organization through solicita-
tion and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas); D'Amico v.
NLRB, 582 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (employee right to engage in collective
bargaining is integral part of Act and provision furthering this right should be
accommodated); NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., 559 F.2d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 1977)
(employees have the right to choose a bargaining representative free from interfer-
ence).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5),(b)(3) (1976) (both union and employer have the
duty to bargain collectively). In this regard, the Board functions to: (1) supervise the
selection of the bargaining representative, id. § 159, and (2) monitor the relationship
among employer, employees and the union. Id. § 160.
19. An employee, labor organization or employer may petition the Board for a
representation election. Id. § 159(c). There must be a 30% showing of interest in the
bargaining unit, see AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 39, 46, to
compel a representation election, and the union must obtain a majority of the votes
cast by members of the Board designated unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Therefore,
when a union has a substantial showing of support it will seek a broad unit while a
poor showing will motivate the union to petition for a narrower unit election. See
Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Health Care Institutions,
36 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 285 (1975). Employees seek broader units, placing the onus on
the union to organize a larger group. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT IN LABOR LAW 67-68
(1976).
20. Generally, health care employers seek the largest possible unit in order to
reduce the number of negotiation sessions with different bargaining agents and the
potential for work slowdowns and disruption. Unions prefer smaller units comprised
of employees with similar skill or job functions. This facilitates the union's adequate
representation of all unit members because the need to harmonize competing inter-
ests is substantially reduced. See Feheley, supra note 19, at 285-86.
21. See Southwest La. Hosp. Ass'n v. Local Union 87, Office & Prof. Employees
Int'l Union, 664 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1982); LABOR LAW 1971, supra note 4,
at 200; Feheley, supra note 19, at 283-85.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
23. LABOR LAw 1971, supra note 4, at 200-01.
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The Act contains few guidelines to aid the Board in its unit determi-
nations. 24 Accordingly, as the specialized body authorized by Con-
gress to regulate labor relations, the Board has been granted broad
discretion in this regard. 25 Its decisions are rarely disturbed absent a
finding that the determination was arbitrary or capricious.26
In the industrial sphere, the Board has developed a "community of
interest" 27 test which it employs on a case-by-case basis28 when mak-
ing unit determinations. The Board seeks to group together employees
24. While § 9(b) does not prescribe specific criteria for establishing units, it does
impose specific statutory limitations on the Board's discretion in determining bar-
gaining units. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). The Act expressly prohibits the Board from
(1) finding a unit appropriate if the unit includes both professional and nonprofes-
sional employees unless a majority of the professionals vote for inclusion in such a
unit, id. § 159(b)(1); (2) deciding that a craft unit is inappropriate because a different
unit had been approved by a prior Board decision unless a majority of the employees
in the proposed unit vote against separate representation, id. § 159(b)(2); (3) finding
a unit appropriate that includes both guards and other employees, id. § 159(b)(3); or
(4) establishing a unit solely on the basis of organization. Id. § 159(c)(5). The
Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he issue as to what unit is appropriate for
bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of law is laid down by statute ...."
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947). In any given case there
may be more than one appropriate unit. The Board need not designate the most
appropriate unit. Its duty extends only to the selection of an appropriate unit. Atlas
Hotels, Inc. v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1975) (Board reasonably
concluded bakery workers constituted appropriate bargaining unit); International
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 844, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Board
decision to place operating engineers at two subsidiaries in separate bargaining units
was appropriate); MPC Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 75, 78-79 (2d Cir.
1973) (Board agent has power to limit evidence submitted in determining unit).
25. Since unit determinations involve a "large measure of informed discretion,"
they are "rarely to be disturbed." Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 491 (substantial
evidence supporting Board unit determination proscribed further judicial inquiry).
Accord South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976) (court of appeals erred in determining the unit instead of
remanding for a Board decision). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497
(1979) (Board's determination that in-plant food prices and services are mandatory
bargaining subjects should not be rejected merely because the courts prefer another
view of the statute).
26. NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 428 F.2d 479, 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1970) (Board
abused its discretion in finding local unit appropriate); Local 1325, Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1194, 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Board failed to justify
its conclusion that a state-wide unit for a retail chain was appropriate); NLRB v.
Campbell Sons' Corp., 407 F.2d 969, 979 (4th Cir. 1969) (employees in Board
certified unit were neither the appropriate unit nor an appropriate unit). Cf. Allied
Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171-73 (1971)
(Board erred in finding that retiree benefits are mandatory subjects of bargaining as
retirees are not employees under the Actf.
27. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962). See generally
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT, supra note 13, at 11-83 (discusses criteria for Board
unit determinations).
28. Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 782, 784 (1952); cf. Chrysler
Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 55, 58-59 (1948) (Board employed community of interest test in
finding unit of office and clerical employees appropriate).
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who share substantial mutual interests in wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment. 29 When considering whether a
community of interest exists among a given group of employees, the
Board reviews such factors as: similarity of skills, duties and working
conditions, 30 the nature of the employer's organization, including the
functional integration, 3' the organizational and the supervisory struc-
ture, 32 the interchange among employees33 and their physical proxim-
ity,34 the bargaining history, 35 the desires of the employees, 3 and the
extent of union organization.
37
29. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 398, 405-06 (1971) (employees of
service station, warehouse, store dock area and retail store at employer's establish-
ment constitute a single unit); Western Wirebound Box Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 748, 759
(1971) (single truck driver unit appropriate); Yale Univ., 184 N.L.R.B. 860, 862
(1970) (nonfaculty, clerical and technical employees in medical school department
placed in one unit).
31. Pickering & Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 772, 773-74 (1980) (high degree of functional
integration at two-plant operation rebutted presumptive appropriateness of single-
plant unit); Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 469, 470 (1971)
(system-wide unit of production and maintenance appropriate where employer's
operations more highly integrated than most utilities); Threads-Inc., 191 N.L.R.B.
667, 668 (1971) (closely integrated functions rendered separate departmental unit
inappropriate).
32. White Castle Sys., Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 111 L.R.R.M. 1280, 1282
(1982) (separate units at each of three restaurants inappropriate due to lack of
supervisory autonomy, uniform operating and personnel procedures and substantial
employee interchange); Wyandotte Sav. Bank, 245 N.L.R.B. 943, 944 (1979) (single
location units appropriate where employees relied on individual branch managers for
direction and evaluation); Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 877-78 (1968) (single
store in retail chain presumptively appropriate).
33. Victoria Station, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1978) (low
degree of employee interchange among different plants justified separate units);
Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 924, 925 (1972) (substantial and frequent
interchange of employees among 30 stores, lack of manager autonomy and geo-
graphic proximity rebuts single-store unit presumption); Purity Supreme, Inc., 197
N.L.R.B. 915, 917 (1972) (single unit inappropriate due to extensive employee
interchange and high degree of centralization and integration in employer's chain).
34. Pomona Convalescent Home, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 112 L.R.R.M. 1087,
1088 (1982) (unit at one of nine facilities appropriate due to distance and administra-
tive autonomy); Legal Action of Wis., Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 110 L.R.R.M.
1189, 1190 (1982) (single location unit appropriate due to substantial geographic
distance between offices); Drug Fair-Community Drug Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 525, 527
(1969) (unit based on a metropolitan area appropriate).
35. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 788, 788 (1974) (bargaining history
is evidence of parties agreement of multi-store bargaining unit); R.L. Sweet Lumber
Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 529, 535 (1973), enforced, 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 986 (1975) (prior bargaining history was determinative in placing employ-
ees in single unit); Buckeye Village Mkt., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 271, 272-73 (1969)
(historical representation by single unit appropriate despite multiple units in other
local grocery stores).
36. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 156 (1941) (Board's use of
self-determination elections in bargaining unit determinations is appropriate); NLRB
v. Ideal Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712, 717 (10th Cir. 1964) (Board
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III. Legislative History of the 1974 Amendments and Congressional
Concern Over Bargaining Unit Proliferation
Passage of the 1974 amendments to the Act restored3 8 federal legis-
lative protection to employees3" of nonprofit health care institutions.40
should consider the desires of employees in bargaining unit determinations); Globe
Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 300 (1937) (when considerations are evenly
balanced, the determining factor is the desire of employees).
37. Ballentine Packing Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 923, 924 (1961); accord NLRB v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1965). However, § 9(c)(5) of the
Act prohibits the Board from finding the extent of union organization among em-
ployees to be controlling in bargaining unit determinations. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5)
(1976).
38. Pub. L. No. 360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974); see note 2 supra. The 1935 statute
(Wagner Act), Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), did not specifically exclude
nonprofit health care institutions from its coverage. Southwest La. Hosp. Ass'n v.
Local Union 87, Office & Prof. Employees Int'l Union, 664 F.2d 1321, 1323 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1982). In the absence of qualifying language or a specific exclusion, the Wagner
Act extended § 7, 49 Stat. at 452, rights to all employees. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, LABOR RELA-
TIONS IN HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 7-8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
LABOR RELATIONS IN HOSPITALS]. Although there was little collective bargaining
activity in the health care field in the early years after the Act's passage, id. at 11, the
Board did assert jurisdiction. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B.
533 (1942) (charitable hospital), enforced, 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945). In enforcing the Board's exercise of jurisdiction, the
circuit court stated that "[w]e cannot understand what considerations of public
policy deprive hospital employees of the privilege granted to the employees of other
institutions." 145 F.2d at 853; accord H.R. REP. No. 1252, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1972); 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 94.
The Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-183, 185-187 (1976)), specifically
exempted nonprofit institutions from the ambit of the Act. 61 Stat. at 137; 120 CONG.
REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 94. Section 2(2) of the Act excluded from the definition of "em-
ployer" "any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net
earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual .... " 61 Stat.
at 137 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976)). This exemption was
premised on the belief that hospital services were local in nature, 93 CONG. REC. 4997
(1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), thereby precluding Board jurisdiction, which is
limited to cases involving enterprises whose operations "affect commerce." See 29
U.S.C. § 152(6)-(7) (1976). Moreover, it was believed that the exemption would ease
the financial burden for many institutions. 93 CONG. REC. 4997 (1947) (statement of
Sen. Tydings); see H.R. REP. No. 1252, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); Vernon, Labor
Relations in the Health Care Field Under the 1974 Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act: An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 202, 203 (1975).
In the years following the Taft-Hartley amendments, the health care industry devel-
oped into a large-scale enterprise, engaged in substantial interstate commercial activ-
ity. 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 95; H.R. REP. No. 1252, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5
(1972). Although they could no longei be characterized as "local, charitable institu-
tions," id., nonprofit hospitals remained free, for the most part, from federal and
state labor legislation. See FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, IMPACT OF
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The legislators of the ninety-third congress4' were motivated by a dual
THE 1974 HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS TO THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 13, 16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FMCS STUDY]; APPRO-
PRIATE BARGAINING UNIT, supra note 13, at 243-44. In the absence of federal legisla-
tion it was the responsibility of the states to enact statutes covering nonprofit hospi-
tals. Id. Prior to 1974, hospital workers were protected by legislation in relatively few
states-Minnesota, New York, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Mich-
igan, Connecticut, Oregon, Montana, Washington, and Rhode Island. See FMCS
STUDY, supra, at 33-43. Eight of these states specifically included nonprofit hospitals
in their statutes. See APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT, supra note 13, at 243 n.13. In
those states lacking a statute granting jurisdiction over nonprofit hospitals and nurs-
ing homes to the state labor relations agency, health care employers were under no
duty to participate in the collective bargaining process. 120 CONG. REC. 16,900
(1974) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5,
at 290.
The existing state laws were subsequently preempted by the federal amendments.
Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 225 N.L.R.B. 678, 679 (1976); In re Minnesota, 219
N.L.R.B. 1095, 1097 (1975); D'Alba, Health Care Decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board Since the 1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROB-
LEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 30 (A. Knapp ed. 1977). The
Board, instead of the state labor relations agencies, now has jurisdiction over health
care institutions which met the Act's requirements. Dorn, The Hospital Amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act-Other Organized Employee's View, in AMEIP-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 114 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
39. At the time of passage of the health care amendments, the number of em-
ployees in nonprofit hospitals constituted 1.5 million, or 56 % of all hospital workers.
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 10; 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 94; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 272; 120
CONG. REC. 16,900 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 291.
40. The definition of "health care institution" in § 2 of the Act was amended to
"include any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization health
clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care
of the sick, infirm, or aged person." 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976). The drafters of the
1974 amendments regarded the health care industry as unique and meritorious of
attention. Senator Taft noted, "[t]his legislation clearly reflects the congressional
recognition that health care is significantly different enough from other aspects of the
economy to merit special protections and procedures under the act." 120 CONG. REC.
13,560 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 256. Therefore,
Congress chose not merely to confer equal status to nonprofit hospitals, but to create
a host of new provisions fashioned to accommodate the special relationship between
the health care industry and the public welfare. See id. at 12,936 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Cranston), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 91; Feheley,
supra note 19, at 236-38; note 2 supra (discussion of the amendments).
41. In the 92d Congress, legislation to repeal the exemption for nonprofit hospi-
tals in § 2(2) of the Act, see H.R. 11,357, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 12,941
(1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), was approved by the House of Representatives by a
wide margin. 118 CONG. REC. 27,135 (1972) (H.R. 11,357, introduced by Reps.
Thompson and Ashbrook, passed by a vote of 285 to 95). It failed, however, to reach
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purpose: 42 to extend the benefits afforded by the Act to nonprofit
hospital employees, 43 and to safeguard the public against disruptions
in patient care. 44 The need to achieve stable labor relations was
the Senate floor. 120 CONG. REC. 12,941 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 105.
Legislation offering a simple exclusion of the exemption was introduced both in the
House and the Senate during the first session of the 93d Congress. See FMCS STUDY,
supra note 38, at 20. On January 3, 1973, Reps. Thompson and Ashbrook re-
introduced their bill. H.R. 1236, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 119 CONG. REC. 67
(1973). On February 7, 1973, Sens. Cranston and Javits submitted legislation to
extend the Act to nonprofit hospitals. S. 794, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 119
CONG. REC. 3762 (1973). See generally 120 CONG. REc. 12,941 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Taft).
42. See 120 CONG. REC. 13,560 (1974) (statement of Sen. Humphrey), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 256-57.
43. Prior to the passage of the amendments, the Board had asserted jurisdiction
over other types of health care institutions including proprietary hospitals and non-
profit nursing homes which met jurisdictional revenue requirements. Drexel Home,
Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1047 (1970) (nonprofit nursing home); Butte Medical
Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967) (proprietary hospital); University Nursing
Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 264 (1967) (proprietary nursing home). See H.R.
REP. No. 1252, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972); 120 CONG. REC. 16,901 (1974) (state-
ment of Sen. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 294. See note
6 supra for a discussion of jurisdictional limitations. While these facilities offered
nearly identical patient care services as nonprofit hospitals, only the latter were
statutorily exempt. 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 95. Consequently, hospital work-
ers lagged far behind other industries in wage increases. Cf. id., reprinted in LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 93 (recognizes weaker economic position of hospital
workers). Low wages and poor working conditions resulted in high and constant
employee turnover. Id. This uneven national policy toward nonprofit health care
workers was further evidenced by their inclusion in a number of federal statutes
other than the Act. 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 95, id. at 16,901 (statement of
Sen. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 294; FMCS STUDY,
supra note 38, at 14 (these statutes included the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act and the Social Security Act).
44. The only avenue open to employees faced with an employer who refused to
accept collective bargaining was to engage in a strike to compel the employer to
recognize or bargain with a union. Congress viewed these recognition strikes as the
major cause of disruptions in the industry. 120 CONG. REC. 12,936 (1974) (statement
of Sen. Cranston), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 91; id. at
12,938 (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5,
at 96; id. at 16,899 (statement of Sen. Thompson), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 288; id. at 16,900 (statement of Sen. Ashbrook), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 290. This approach to secure the basic right of
representation interrupted, and consequently adversely affected, patient care. 120
CONG. REC. 12,945 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 5, at 116. Thus, Senator Taft noted, "the committee ...took a
significant step forward in establishing the factor of public interest to be considered
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accorded high priority because of the vital nature of medical care. 45
Disruptions caused by organizational drives and recognitional strikes4"
in the health care setting, unlike those in industrial plants, were
thought by Congress to threaten the quality and delivery of life-
sustaining services. 47
Because health care institutions employ individuals in an extraordi-
nary range of job classifications, 48 the medical industry was believed
to be "particularly vulnerable to a multiplicity of bargaining units." 49
The legislators reasoned that unwarranted unit fragmentation, lead-
ing to jurisdictional disputes and concomitant work disruptions, 50
would result if each group were permitted to engage separately in
collective bargaining. This could have an adverse effect on the cost of
medical care, especially if rival unions were to engage in wage "leap-
frogging" 5' and "whipsawing. ' ' 52 Thus, bargaining unit proliferation
by the Board in unit cases." Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at
114.
45. Id. at 12,945 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 116.
46. See note 44 supra; 120 CONG. REG. 16,899 (1974) (statement of Sen. Thomp-
son), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 289.
47. 120 CONG. REC. 12,938 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 97; Feheley, supra note 19, at 236-37.
48. LABOR RELATIONS IN HOSPITALS, supra note 38, at 11.
49. 120 CONG. REC. 12,944 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 113. Many occupational groupings were already
afforded representation through national organizations, while other skilled occupa-
tions which had traditionally enjoyed a long history of unionization in the industrial
sphere offered fresh opportunities for recruitment. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT,
supra note 13, at 245.
50. 120 CONG. REC. 12,944 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 114.
51. Id. at 12,945 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 114. See Trustees of the Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699
F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1983). Leapfrogging refers to a situation in which an em-
ployer, who has already bargained with several unions separately, is forced to
renegotiate more favorable terms with the last union to have reached an agreement.
H. ROBERTS, ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 284 (2d ed. 1971). The
other unions then may demand the same terms as the hold-out union which leap-
frogged over the agreement pattern already set by the other unions. Id.
52. 120 CONG. REG. 12,945 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 114. See Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404
(1982); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 281 (1965); Arden Elec., 262 N.L.R.B. No.
37, 110 L.R.R.M. 1529, 1529 (1982) (Jenkins & Hunter, MM., dissenting); Kaiser
Steel Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 643, 645 (1981). Whipsawing is a union tactic whereby a
union seeking to obtain benefits from a number of employers applies pressure to one
in order to use this as a base to obtain the same, or greater benefits from the others.
H. ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 581.
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was an issue of major concern during the congressional debates. 53
Minimizing the number of bargaining units was regarded as a method
to achieve a balance between labor stability and continuity of health
care. 54
Senator Taft, in his initial bill, 5, sought to limit statutorily the
number of bargaining units in the health care industry to four. 56 This
rigid approach, however, was not adopted.57 Instead, a compromise 58
was reached whereby Congress left undisturbed the broad discretion-
ary powers accorded by the Act to Board unit determinations, 59 but
indicated its stance against bargaining unit proliferation in the health
53. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,944-45 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 113-14; id. at 13,559-60 (statement of Sen.
Taft), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 255; id. at 22,949 (state-
ment of Rep. Ashbrook), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 411;
Bumpass, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions: An Analysis of
Congressional Intent and Its Implementation by the National Labor Relations Board,
20 B.C.L. REV. 867, 871-74 (1979); Feheley, supra note 19, at 287-89.
54. 120 CONG.' REC. 12,944-45 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 113-14.
55. On July 31, 1973, Senator Taft introduced S. 2292. 119 CONG. REC. 26,792
(1973). This bill went beyond the Cranston-Javits straight exemption, see note 41
supra, by including pre-strike and picketing notice requirements and limitations on
the number of bargaining units in health care institutions to safeguard patient care
continuity. 119 CONG. REC. 26,792-94 (1973), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 106-11.
56. 119 CONG. REC. 26,792 (1973). These units included: (1) professional employ-
ees, (2) technical employees, (3) clerical employees, and (4) service and maintenance
employees. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 26,793 (1973).
57. The bill was never reported out of committee. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,943-44
(1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 111-12. The Ninth Circuit
has suggested that "[i]t is likely that rejection was based on a perceived need for
flexibility according to which more than four units might be appropriate for very
large employers with highly diverse personnel, while fewer might be necessary for
health care providers with smaller or more homogeneous work forces." NLRB v.
HMO Int'l/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, Inc., 678 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1982).
58. See 120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 5, at 361; S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1975) (individual views of
Sen. Dominick), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 46. The Senate
and House bills were identical except for the addition of two house amendments
dealing with an emergency board cooling off procedure and the rights of employees
not to join unions based on their religious convictions. The conference committee
adopted a modified form of both. FMCS STUDY, supra note 38, at 21-22.
59. Section 9(b) of the Act-which confers upon the Board the power to desig-
nate appropriate bargaining units-remained unchanged. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976);
see text accompanying notes 15-18 supra for a discussion of § 9(b). Thus, the amend-
ments did not create special rules for bargaining unit determinations. Memorial
Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351, 360 n.12 (3d Cir. 1976). See notes 24-26 supra and
accompanying text.
[Vol. XI
HEALTH CARE BARGAINING UNITS
care field by issuing a statement in both the House and Senate confer-
ence reports:
Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this
connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board
decisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center . . .and Woodland Park
Hospital. . .as well as the trend toward broader units enunciated
in Extendicare of West Virginia .... 60
The specific approval of these decisions, which limit the number of
bargaining units in the health care industry, reflected the legislative
desire to avoid unit proliferation. Varying interpretations of the con-
gressional intent as expressed in the committee reports, however, has
resulted in disagreement between the Board and the federal circuit
courts. 6'
IV. Interpretation of Legislative Intent: The Two Views
A. The Board
Since passage of the 1974 amendments, the Board has found various
units to be appropriate in the health care field. These determinations
have included professional units of registered nurses,6 2 physicians, 63
and residual professional employees.6 4 Appropriate non-professional
60. H,R. REP. No. 1051, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 275; S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974)
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 12 (citations omitted). In Four
Seasons Nursing Center, the Board refused to certify a bargaining unit consisting of
two maintenance employees out of a nursing home staff of 143. 208 N.L.R.B. 403,
403 (1974). In Woodland Park Hospital, the Board dismissed a petition for a separate
unit of x-ray technicians. 205 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1973). In Extendicare of West
Virginia, the Board found a combined unit of service, maintenance and technical
employees appropriate in order to avoid "unwarranted unit fragmentation." 203
N.L.R.B. 1232, 1233 (1973).
In a footnote to the committee reports, Congress cautioned that "[b]y our reference
to Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve all of the holdings of that decision." S.
REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 n.1 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY,
supra note 5, at 12; see H.R. REP. No. 1051, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.1 (1974),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 275 (contains materially identical
footnote). This has been interpreted by the Board to refer to its decision in Extendi-
care to exclude licensed practical nurses from the broader bargaining unit. See St.
Catherine's Hosp. of Dominican Sisters, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 787, 788 (1975).
61. See generally Husband, Determining Appropriate Bargaining Units in
Health Care Institutions-The Gap Widens, 32 LAB. L.J. 780 (1981) (discusses the
conflict between the Board and the courts over the standard for unit determinations
in health care facilities).
62. See notes 74-78 infra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Montefiore Hosp., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 110 L.R.R.M. 1048, 1049
(1982); Ohio Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 604, 605 (1977).
64. See, e.g., Samaritan Health Servs., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 629, 634 (1978);
Sutter Community Hosps., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1976).
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units have included technical employees,6 5 service and maintenance
employees, 66 business office clerical employees, 67 and maintenance
department employees.6 1 In its initial health care unit determina-
tions, 6 9 the Board specifically acknowledged the importance of the
congressional directive.7 0 In subsequent decisions, on the other hand,
65. See notes 79-93 infra and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Trustees of the Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund, 261 N.L.R.B. No.
49, 110 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1982), enforcement granted, 699 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1983);
Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 929, 931 (1977).
67. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 877 (1978), enforcement denied,
608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979) extended to the health field the industrial policy of
granting separate units to clericals who perform mostly business-type functions and
those whose work relationship is closer to service and maintenance employees. See
Mercy Hosps., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 770 (1975), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979);
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 217 N.L.R.B. 797, 798 (1975). This distinction is
inconsistent with the congressional approval of broader units and the Board's rejec-
tion of the "direct" and "indirect" patient care dichotomy as a basis for determining
unit composition. See Mount Airy Found., 217 N.L.R.B. 802, 802 (1975). Moreover,
this division has resulted in inconsistent placement of occupational classifications.
Compare St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 222 N.L.R.B. 674, 677 (1976) (admitting clerks
placed in business office clerical unit) with William W. Backus Hosp., 220 N.L.R.B.
414, 416 (1975) (admitting clerks placed in service and maintenance unit).
68. See notes 94-107 infra and accompanying text.
69. Shortly after passage of the health amendments, the Board issued a group of
consolidated bargaining unit determinations which set a basic five-unit structure for
the industry. The following decisions established units of registered nurses, residual
professionals, technical employees, business office clericals, and service and mainte-
nance employees: Mercy Hosps., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975) (registered nurses,
service and maintenance, and business office clericals), enforcement denied, 589
F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); St. Catherine's Hosp. of
Dominican Sisters, 217 N.L.R.B. 787 (1975) (technical, office clerical, and service
and maintenance); Newington Children's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 793 (1975) (service
and maintenance, including "hospital" clericals); Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 217
N.L.R.B. 797 (1975) (business office clericals); Duke Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799 (1975)
(maintenance unit); Mount Airy Found., 217 N.L.R.B. 802 (1975) (nonprofessional
unit excluding business office clericals). Two other cases were also decided in this
group. Nathan & Miriam Barnert Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 775 (1975)
(service and maintenance, and technical); Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children,
217 N.L.R.B. 806 (1975) (unit of stationary engineers found inappropriate).
70. In Mercy Hosps., Inc., the Board noted, "our consideration of all issues
concerning the composition of appropriate bargaining units in the health care indus-
try must necessarily take place against this background of avoidance of undue prolif-
eration .... " 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 766 (1975). Thus, in Shriners Hosps. for Crippled
Children, 217 N.L.R.B. 806 (1975), a petition for five stationary engineers was
rejected though the Board recognized that similar units had been approved in other
industries. Id. at 808. For Board approval of boilerroom operator units, see, e.g.,
B.P. Alaska, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 986, 987(1977) (oil production); Towmotor Corp.,
187 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1028 (1971) (truck manufacturing); Empire State Sugar Co., 166
N.L.R.B. 31, 34 (1967) (processing, 'manufacture, sale and distribution of sugar
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the Board has often made only brief mention of the congressional
mandate in applying the community of interest test. 71 The Board has
steadfastly maintained that its use of this test "satisfies legislative
concern regarding unit fragmentation in the health care industry. 72
Nevertheless, some Board health care decisions have had the effect
of encouraging unit proliferation despite references to the legislative
intent. Thus, although the Board acknowledged the need to minimize
the number of bargaining units,73 it established an irrebutable pre-
sumption in favor of registered nurse units74 in Mercy Hospitals, Inc. 75
products), enforced, 401 F.2d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 156
N.L.R.B. 946, 948 (1966) (pulp and paper production).
Other early Board unit cases demonstrating recognition of the congressional
mandate include: Riverside Methodist Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1084 (1976) (unit
of plant operations department employees inappropriate viewed against the congres-
sional admonition), rev'd, 241 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1979) (maintenance unit found appro-
priate in health field); The Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 223 N.L.R.B. 614, 616 (1976) (unit of
engineering department employees inappropriate viewed against the congressional
admonition); Duke Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799, 800 (1975) (switchboard operators unit
congressionally foreclosed); St. Catherine's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. at 789 (Board
weighed legislative history to conclude that neither a separate unit of licensed practi-
cal nurses nor x-ray technicians were appropriate).
71. See notes 136-56 & 161-96 infra and accompanying text for court criticism of
Board health care unit determinations.
72. Riverside, 241 N.L.R.B. at 1183. Accord St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B.
No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153, 1158 (1982) (Board reaffirmed reliance on community
of interest standard). See notes 97-113 infra for a discussion of St. Francis Hospital.
In Allegheny Gen. Hosp., the Board stated, "Congress intended that the appropriate-
ness of health care units should be determined by the Board's traditional community-
of-interests criteria .... " 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 875 (1978), enforcement denied, 608 F.
2d 965, 971 (3d Cir. 1979). See Bumpass, supra note 53, at 897-900.
73. See note 70 supra.
74. In Mercy Hosps., the Board relied upon the "impressive" and "singular"
history of separate collective bargaining by registered nurses to establish the irrebut-
table presumption. 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 767 (1975). However, the Mercy record
contained no evidence indicating that such a bargaining history existed. See Bum-
pass, supra note 53, at 910; Emanuel, Hospital Bargaining Unit Decisions, in AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 193-94 (A. Knapp ed. 1971). Conse-
quently, the Board based its rationale for a separate registered nurse unit on oral
arguments and its own past decisions. Mercy Hosps., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. at 767. This
presumption, see also Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., 218 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1975) (in
absence of petition for registered nurse unit, certification of professionals excluding
registered nurses is appropriate); Methodist Hosp. Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975)
(registered nurses entitled to representation in separate unit), prohibited an employer
from submitting evidence to refute the appropriateness of a registered nurse unit and
resulted in comparatively small "residual" professional units. See, e.g., Morristown-
Hamblen Hosp. Ass'n, 226 N.L.R.B. 76, 78 (1976) (four emergency room physicians
and one registered pharmacist); Doctor's Community Hosp., 220 N.L.R.B. 977, 977,
978 n.4 (1975) (two physical therapists and one therapeutic dietician); Bishop Ran-
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Moreover, while the Board subsequently abandoned this expansive
policy in favor of a case-by-case approach in New ton-Wellesley Hospi-
tal,"6 it has continued to find separate nurse units appropriate 77 even
in instances where registered nurses participated in a team approach
to patient care and worked in proximity with other professionals. 78
The Board has established a policy tantamount to automatic ap-
proval of separate technical units 79 which, it has, with some excep-
tions, continued to adhere to.80 In Barnert Memorial Hospital Cen-
dall Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1131 (1975) (four medical technologists and one
pharmacist).
75. 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975).
76. 250 N.L.R.B. 409, 411 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 256 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1116 (1981);
The Long Island College Hosp., 256 N.L.R.B. 202, 206 (1981); Milwaukee Chil-
dren's Hosp. Ass'n, 255 N.L.R.B. 1009, 1011 (1981); Doctors' Hosp. of Montclair,
254 N.L.R.B. 1374, 1375 (1981); National Medical Convalescent, 254 N.L.R.B.
1354, 1358 (1981); Frederick Memorial Hosp. Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 36, 37 (1981),
enforcement denied, 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982); Addison-Gilbert Hosp., 253
N.L.R.B. 1010, 1011 (1981); St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., 252 N.L.R.B. 50, 51 (1980).
See Emanuel, supra note 74, at 193 n.38.
On the other hand, the Board has, at times, placed registered nurses in the same
unit as other professionals. Cf. St. John of God Hosp., Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. No. 117,
109 L.R.R.M. 1209, 1210 (1982) (unit of registered nurses, licensed practical nurses
and two technical employees); Doctors Osteopathic Hosp., 242 N.L.R.B. 447, 448
n.6 (1979) (unit of all professional and nonprofessional employees not in dispute);
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 230 N.L.R.B. 438, 439 (1977) (registered nurses
shared close working relationship and had community of interest with other profes-
sional employees); Family Doctor Medical Group, 226 N.L.R.B. 118, 121 (1976)(small facility and close working relationship among professionals).
The circuit courts have found that registered nurse units may be appropriate only
when the Board considers all relevant criteria, including the congressional directive.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp., Inc., 691 F.2d 191, 194-95 (4th Cir.
1982); HMO Int'l, 678 F.2d at 812; St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 416; cj. Hillside
Medical Center, 685 F.2d at 35.
78. Brookwood Hosp., 252 N.L.R.B. 748, 749 (1980) (Board concluded that
team approach to health care did not result in an all-professional unit). The Board
subsequently retreated in Mount Airy Found. where it indicated that when registered
nurses and other professionals share job functions, separate registered nurse units will
not be approved. 253 N.L.R.B. 1003, 1006 (1981). But see Ralph K. Davies Medical
Center, 256 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1116 (1981) (separate registered nurse unit appropriate
despite shared characteristics with other professionals).
79. Barnert Memorial Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. at 777; Newington Children's Hosp.,
217 N.L.R.B. 793, 795 (1975).
80. See Pine Manor, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1654, 1656 (1978) (technical employees
granted option to have separate representation or join service and maintenance unit);
Appalachian Regional Hosps., Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 542, 543 (1977) (service, mainte-
nance, and technical employees shared supervisors, had integrated job functions and
had substantial contact with each other); National G. South, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B.
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ter,81 the Board found a unit of technical employees appropriate over
the objections of the hospital that they should have been included in
the service and maintenance unit. The finding that these employees
are frequently certified, licensed or registered by schools, governmen-
tal bodies or private organizations was viewed as an overriding factor
in favor of separate representation.8 2 Similarly, in Newington Chil-
dren's Hospital,8 3 the Board granted requests to exclude technical
employees from maintenance and service units.8 4
Decisions that have followed these cases have overwhelmingly
granted separate representation to technical employees.8 5 Yet such
decisions do not fully consider the legislative history of the 1974
amendments. The House and Senate committee reports which accom-
panied the amendments cited with approval 6 Woodland Park Hospi-
tal 7 and Extendicare of West Virginia, Inc.,88 wherein the Board
denied separate representation to technical workers, including them
in the larger unit of service and maintenance employees.8 9 Moreover,
the automatic approval of such units conflicts with the Board's tradi-
tional test for technical units in the industrial sphere. In The Sheffield
Corp.,9° the Board overruled its prior test, which automatically ex-
cluded industrial employees from production and maintenance
976, 979 (1977) (unit of all nonsupervisory personnel, including vocational nurses
and service and maintenance employees found appropriate); Illinois Extended Care
Convalescent Center, 220 N.L.R.B 1085, 1085 (1975) (four technical employees
included in comprehensive unit).
81. 217 N.L.R.B. 775 (1975).
82. Id. at 776.
83. 217 N.L.R.B. 793 (1975).
84. Id. at 794.
85. See, e.g., Schlesinger Geriatric Center, 260 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 109 L.R.R.M.
1171, 1172 (1982) (technical employees excluded from nursing home's service and
maintenance unit); Community Health Servs., Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 362, 363 (1981)
(technical unit of mental health workers); Butler Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 1310, 1310
n.2 (1980) (technical unit of mental health workers); Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239
N.L.R.B. 872, 877 (1978), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979) (Board
adhered to industrial sector's unit pattern in finding separate units of technical and
service and maintenance employees appropriate); Middlesex Gen. Hosp., 239
N.L.R.B. 837, 837 (1978) (employees who meet specialized training and certification
requirements placed in technical unit); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n., 223 N.L.R.B. at 617
(Board refused to place technical employees in service and maintenance unit). See
Emanuel, supra note 74, at 198 n.59.
86. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
87. 205 N.L.R.B. 838 (1973).
88. 203 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1973).
89. 205 N.L.R.B. at 889; 203 N.L.R.B. at 1233.
90. 134 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1961).
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units,91 and replaced it with a "pragmatic judgment" based on the
traditional community of interest criteria.92 Thus, while separate rep-
resentation for technical employees is considered on a case-by-case
basis in the industrial sphere, health care technical employees are
frequently granted separate units on the basis of licensure, registration
or certification.9 3
Since Allegheny General Hospital,94 the Board has steadfastly
granted separate representation to maintenance employees when they
meet the community of interest test9 5 as applied in the industrial
sphere.96 Recently, in St. Francis Hospital, 7 the Board considered
91. Litton Indus. Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 722, 725 (1959) (technical employees auto-
matically excluded from production and maintenance units).
92. The Sheffield Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. at 1103-04. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 214
N.L.R.B. 382, 386 (1974) (technical employees will not be represented separately
where evidence reveals they perform interrelated tasks with other employees).
93. Reliance on these factors has arguably resulted in (1) the Board ceding its
authority to states and private organizations and (2) improper approval of units on an
automatic basis. See Barnert Memorial Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. at 784-86 (Kennedy &
Penello, MM., dissenting); King, Legislative View: Is Congressional Intent Being
Realized-Or Are Significant Changes Needed?, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LA-
BOR RELATIONS LAW, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 147, 165-69 (A. Knapp ed. 1977); Bumpass, supra note 53, at
906 nn. 236-38.
94. 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (1978), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965, 971 (3d Cir.
1979). Prior to this case, Board decisions in this area were regarded by the circuit
courts as being in a state of "disarray." Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566
F.2d 833, 844 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). Although the Board
unanimously agreed in Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Cincinnati, 223 N.L.R.B. 614 (1976),
that separate maintenance units are not congressionally foreclosed, they could not
agree on what test to apply. See id. at 616, 625. A divided Board, utilizing various
tests, yielded inconsistent decisions which included both approval and rejection of
separate maintenance units. See, e.g., decisions cited in NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n,
606 F.2d 22, 26 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971(1980), and NLRB v.
West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 215 n.1 (7th Cir. 1978).
95. See, e.g., St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153,
1154, 1162 (1982); Garden City Hosp., 244 N.L.R.B. 778, 779 (1979); Divine Provi-
dence Hosp., 248 N.L.R.B. 521, 523 (1980); Southern Baptist Hosps., Inc., 242
N.L.R.B. 1329, 1330-31 (1979); St. Vincent Hosp. & Medical Center, 241 N.L.R.B.
492, 493 (1979); Southern Md. Hosp. Center, 241 N.L.R.B. 494, 495 (1979);
Faulkner Hosp., 242 N.L.R.B. 47, 49 (1979).
96. American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961) (maintenance unit is
appropriate where there is separate departmental status, supervision, and utilization
of maintenance skills). Former Board Chairman Van De Water has observed that the
Board's analysis of maintenance units in the health care industry is indistinguishable
from its bargaining unit determinations in other industries. St. Francis Hosp., 265
N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153, 1168 (1982) (Van De Water, C., dissenting).
Compare American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909 (1961) (manufacturing) with
Southern Baptist Hosps., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1979) (health care).
97. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982).
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traditional industrial factors 98 in approving a separate unit of thirty-
nine hospital maintenance workers from a complement of over four
hundred employees.99 This ruling is consistent with the Board's trend
toward certification of such units'00 despite the specific congressional
approval of Four Seasons Nursing Center'0' in which the Board dis-
missed a petition for a separate maintenance unit. 0 2 In reaching its
decision in St. Francis Hospital, the Board reaffirmed its use of the
traditional community of interest criteria in its health care unit deter-
minations. 0 3 Presented as a "two-tiered" approach, 0 4 this procedure
varies from its industrial counterpart in one respect-the Board has
predetermined that it will consider units only if they conform to one of
seven named categories. 05 This "preliminary step" 106 to its usual com-
munity of interest analysis is intended to screen out, and thereby
restrict, the number of units. 0 7 Yet, under the following circum-
stances, this figure could be inflated beyond seven units: (1) a separate
guard unit pursuant to statutory requirement; 08 (2) where a prior
bargaining relationship existed with an employee group which does
not conform to one of the seven basic units;0 9 (3) a stipulation of the
parties;" l0 (4) unit approval due to comity;"' or (5) some other "ex-
98. Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1161-62.
99. Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
100. McLean Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. 424, 426 (1978); Trinity Memorial Hosp.,
Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 855, 856 (1977); Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for the Aged, 230
N.L.R.B. 255, 256 (1977); Sinai Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. 425, 426 (1976); West Subur-
ban Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1351 (1977), enforcement denied, 570 F. 2d 213, 216
(7th Cir. 1978); St. Francis Hosp. Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 1451, 1455 (1976).
See note 95 supra.
101. 208 N.L.R.B. 403 (1971), cited with approval in H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 275; S.
REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 5, at 12.
102. 208 N.L.R.B. 403, 403 (1974) (Board dismissed a petition for unit of two
maintenance employees). Accord Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d
858, 862-64 (1980).
103. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
104. Id.
105. These categories include the following groups of employees: physicians, regis-
tered nurses, other professional employees, technical employees, business office cleri-
cal employees, service and maintenance employees, and skilled maintenance employ-
ees. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976).
109. Bay Medical Center, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 607, 609 (1977), enforcement
granted, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
110. Otis Hosp., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 164 (1975).
111. Long Island College Hosp., 228 N.L.R.B. 83, 87, enforcement denied, 566
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
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traordinary circumstance." 12 Arguably, "by any reasonable defini-
tion of the term, this constitutes unit proliferation."'13
Thus, the Board's willingness to grant separate representation to
numerous groups of employees has not always resulted in the proper
balance between its application of the community of interest test and
the special needs of a vital industry to minimize the number of bar-
gaining units. 114
B. The Circuits
There is no provision in the Act for direct judicial review of Board
unit determinations. Although the Act does provide that any party
"aggrieved by a final order" of the Board may be granted review in
the United States Court of Appeals, 115 decisions in representation
proceedings are not considered to be "final orders.""6 Thus, a party
seeking judicial review must commit an unfair labor practice," 7 usu-
ally achieved through employer refusal to bargain with the union,""
in order to challenge a Board unit ruling. When judicial review is
sought, it is the duty of the court to determine whether the Board has
overstepped its power 119 in the underlying representation proceeding.
Moreover, "[w]hen the Board so exercises the discretion given to it by
Congress, it must 'disclose the basis of its order' and 'give clear indica-
tion that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress empow-
ered it.' "120
112. See St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153, 1160
(1982); Southwest Health Servs., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 110 L.R.R.M. 1461, 1462
(1982) (unit of ambulance service employees); Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical
Center, 242 N.L.R.B. 322 (1979) (unit of chauffeur drivers).
113. Emanuel, supra note 74, at 192.
114. See notes 121-27 & 136-96 infra and accompanying text for criticism of
exclusive Board reliance on the community of interest test.
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1976).
116. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940).
117. See Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137 (1971); Southwest La.
Hosp. Ass'n v. Local Union 87, Office & Prof. Employees Int'l Union, 664 F.2d 1321,
1322-23 (5th Cir. 1982). See note 8 supra for cases denying enforcement of Board
bargaining unit determinations.
118. Trustees of the Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 635
n.17 (2d Cir. 1983).
.119. Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 491; see Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171-72 (1971).
120. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443 (1965) (quoting
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941)). The Board may explain the
basis for its orders by referring to its other decisions or general practices. Id. at 443
n.6. However, when the Board has reached a novel conclusion, it must find the
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Since passage of the 1974 amendments, circuit courts have reviewed
twenty Board health care unit determinations.' 2' Despite their limited
power of judicial review, the courts have denied enforcement in
sixteen instances. 2 2 The courts have repeatedly criticized the Board
for failing to balance the traditional community of interest criteria
against the congressional admonition to prevent unit proliferation.
23
Judicial deference, usually accorded liberally,2 4 is not present in these
cases because of the circuit court view that the Board has failed to
specify "the manner in which its unit determination . . . implement[s]
or reflect[s] that admonition .. ."125 The courts have expressed their
disagreement with the Board's approach by: (1) advocating the adop-
tion of the so-called "disparity of interest" test, 26 and (2) emphasizing
the principle of nonproliferation in the application of the traditional
community of interest criteria.
27
1. Disparity of Interest Test
The Ninth Circuit has proposed, 2 and the Tenth Circuit has
adopted, 11 a new "disparity of interest" standard for the Board to
apply in its health care unit determinations. In NLRB v. St. Francis
Hospital, 130 the Ninth Circuit proposed that the Board focus its in-
"reasons for the decisions in and distinctions among these cases .... ." Id. at 442. See
generally Zimmerman, The NLRB and the Courts: Mutual Respect is Overdue, in
LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 60-66 (1982) (lectures presented at the Institute on Labor
Law, Dallas, Texas, Oct. 29-30, 1981) (discusses relationship between the Board and
the circuit courts in the context of registered nurse unit decisions); Feerick, The
Second Circuit And the NLRB, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (reviews role of
Board and circuit courts in unit determinations).
121. See note 8 supra.
122. See note 8 supra; see also notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text (limited
judicial review of Board unit determinations).
123. See notes 136-56 & 161-96 infra and accompanying text.
124. See note 25 supra.
125. NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting NLRB
v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
971(1980).
126. See notes 128-56 infra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 161-96 infra and accompanying text.
128. NLRB v. Foundation for Comprehensive Health Servs., 654 F.2d 731 (9th
Cir. 1981) (mem.); NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F.2d
806 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
129. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.
1981),modified, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. dismissed, 103
S. Ct. 433 (1982); St. Anthony Hosp. Sys. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981),
modified sub nom. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697
(10th Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982); Presbyte-
rian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 456, 457 (10th Cir. 1981).
130. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
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quiry on the disparity instead of the community of interest among a
given group of employees.' 3' Referring to Senator Williams' state-
ment132 that "a notable disparity of interests between employees in
different job classifications"'' 33 could sometimes require a number of
bargaining units, the court stated,
[w]e view that language and the remaining legislative history of the
1974 amendments to the Act as requiring the Board to determine
not the similarities among employees in the same job classification
(indeed the fact that they share the same classification would inevi-
tably lead to the discovery of many similarities), but instead the
"disparity of interests" among employee classifications which
would prevent a combination of groups of employees into a single
broader unit thereby minimizing unit proliferation.' 34
The disparity of interest approach addresses the congressional ap-
proval of broader units by directing attention to those separate em-
ployee interests which, if they were to be included in the larger unit,
would inhibit fair representation. 3 5 Thus, in St. Francis Hospital, 36
131. Id. at 419.
132. During consideration of the Senate conference report, Sen. Williams stated
that
the National Labor Relations Board has shown good judgment in estab-
lishing appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining, particu-
larly in wrestling with units in newly covered industries. While the Board
has, as a rule, tended to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of collective
bargaining units, sometimes circumstances require that there be a number
of bargaining units among nonsupervisory employees, particularly where
there is such a history in the area or a notable disparity of interests
between employees in different job classifications.
120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974). There is disagreement as to the weight which should
be accorded to Sen. Williams' remarks. Post-passage statements of legislators "cannot
serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act's passage."
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) (emphasis added).
The Senator made his statement after passage of the bill by both houses of congress,
but before adoption of the conference reports. Some courts and commentators regard
the statements as post-passage and thus contend that they should not be considered.
See Bumpass, supra note 53, at 874-82. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has
interpreted the Senator's words as "entirely consistent" with the legislative history of
the amendments. St. Francis, 601 F. 2d at 415 n.12.
133. 601 F.2d at 415.
134. Id. at 419.
135. The bargaining agent is under the duty to represent all employees equally
and fairly regardless of union membership or activities. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967). A union breaches its duty of fair representation when its conduct toward
a bargaining unit member is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Id. at 190.
This duty is incumbent upon the union regardless of bargaining unit size. Thus, it is
unlikely that the Court was referring to this standard, as to do so would require
prospective proof that the union representative would breach this duty.
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the court rejected the Board's irrebutable presumption rule in favor of
registered nurses as a failure to give "due consideration" to the con-
gressional mandate 137 and instructed the Board to center its analysis
on whether the interests of the nurses are so distinct from the other
professional employees that their inclusion in an overall unit would
violate their right to fair representation. 13
8
The Board declined to adopt this suggestion, characterizing the
difference in approaches as "largely semantic."13 9 In Newton-Welles-
ley Hospital, 40 the Board argued that the disparity of interest test is
already encompassed within the traditional criteria and as such the
court's standard is only distinctive in degree, not in substance.1
4
'
Thus, the Board concluded that its traditional analysis did conform to
St. Francis Hospital.'42
Nevertheless, in Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v.
NLRB,143 the Tenth Circuit adopted the disparity of interest test and
distinguished it from the community of interest test. 44 The court
explained that the appropriateness of the registered nurse unit should
be determined from the dissimilarity of employee interests rather than
the similarity of training, hours, and conditions of employment. 145 It
is the identification of different elements that determines which em-
ployees are not to be included in the proposed unit. The court outlined
the proper approach as one which begins with a broad unit that may
be narrowed by the exclusion of employees deemed to have separate
interests from the larger group. 146 This departs from the Board's ap-
proach, which is to start with a narrow unit and subsequently add
employees who have similar interests. 147
136. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 414.
138. Id. at 416.
139. Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 409, 411 (1980); see also Trustees of
the Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 641 (2d Cir. 1983)
(discusses Board's analysis of the disparity of interest test).
140. 250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980).
141. 250 N.L.R.B. at 412. The Board's interpretation of the disparity of interest
test has been echoed by the Second Circuit. Trustees of the Masonic Hall, 699 F.2d
626 (2d Cir. 1983).
142. 250 N.L.R.B. at 412.
143. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 456.
145. Id. at 457 n.6.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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In NLRB v. HMO International/California Medical Group Health
Plan,148 the Ninth Circuit once again called upon the Board to modify
its traditional approach by adopting a disparity of interest test.149 The
Board certified a separate unit of registered nurses instead of the
employer-requested unit of both registered and licensed vocational
nurses. 50 The court did not rule on whether the registered nurse unit
was appropriate.151 Rather, it remanded for a legal and factual analy-
sis of the nonproliferation issue, 15 2 noting that the Board had neither
fulfilled its responsibility to consider the public interest nor had it
developed a viable method to implement congressional intent.' 3
Similarly, in NLRB v. Foundation for Comprehensive Health Serv-
ices, 54 the Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order for
a unit of professional employees which excluded a social worker 155
and remanded for consideration of the unit determination in light of
the disparity of interest test.156
Recently, two Members of the Board have joined the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits in concluding that the disparity of interest analysis
embodies the standard intended by Congress. In St. Francis Hospi-
tal, 157 former Chairman Van De Water and Board Member Hunter,
in separate dissents, rejected the majority's use of the community of
interest test' 58 in its health care unit determinations as violative of
legislative intent. 1 9 Employing the disparity of interest test, both
dissenting Members concluded that the maintenance employees who
were granted separate representation did not exhibit a sufficient de-
gree of separateness to justify their own unit. 60
148. 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
149. Id. at 809, 810.
150. Id. at 807.
151. Id. at 812.
152. Id. at 811.
153. Id. at 808.
154. 654 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1981) (mem.).
155. See Foundation for Comprehensive Health Servs. 251 N.L.R.B. 161(1980).
156. See Foundation for Comprehensive Health Servs. 261 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 109
L.R.R.M. 1377 (1982).
157. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1983).
158. Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1157-58, 1160 (Fannin, Jenkins & Zimmerman, MM.).
See notes 103-13 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority
opinion.
159. St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1168-69 (Van De
Water, C., dissenting); id. at 1173 (Hunter, M., dissenting).
160. Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1168 (Van De Water, C., dissenting); id. at 1175
(Hunter, M., dissenting).
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2. Community of Interest Test and the Public Interest
In Trustees of the Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 161 the
Second Circuit recently rejected the disparity of interest test in favor
of a legal standard which balances the traditional community of
interest factors against the public interest in preventing unit fragmen-
tation. 16 2 It has interpreted this balancing approach to be the appro-
priate legal standard in unit health care determinations "by consensus
of the circuits." 6 3 The court granted enforcement to a Board order for
a service and maintenance unit of four hundred employees, compris-
ing eighty-four percent of all nonsupervisory workers in the employ-
er's four facilities.1 64 Although the court noted that the Board did not
articulate how it engaged in the balancing approach mandated by
Congress, it inferred from the resulting broad unit that the Board had
taken the nonproliferation policy into account. 165 The court distin-
guished previous Board orders which were not enforced because of
their failure to properly balance the application of traditional unit
principles and the congressional admonition. 66 A review of court
cases confirms this observation.
In NLRB v. Mercy Hospital Association,1 67 the Second Circuit de-
nied enforcement of the Board's order establishing a separate bargain-
ing unit for twenty-three maintenance employees from a hospital
force of more than twelve hundred.' 8 The court, observing that the
Board had not complied with the congressional concern "that less
extreme unit fragmentation arising from application of usual indus-
trial unit criteria could . . . impede effective delivery of health care
services,"169 concluded that the Board had premised its unit determi-
nation solely on the community of interest criteria without giving
weight to the public interest factor. 70 Similarly, in Long Island Jew-
ish-Hillside Medical Center v. NLRB,1'7 the Second Circuit criticized
the Board's reluctance to effectuate the congressional policy against
161. 699 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1983).
162. Id. at 632, 641-42.
163. Id. at 632.
164. Id. at 627-28, 636.
165. Id. at 637.
166. Id. at 636, distinguishing Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, 685
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1982); Mercy Hosp., 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 445
U.S. 971 (1980); St. Vincent's Hosp., 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
167. 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 (1980).
168. Id. at 24.
169. Id. at 27.
170. Id.
171. 685 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1982).
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unit proliferation and its reliance on industrial criteria in the health
care industry. 72 The Board had employed a single facility presump-
tion 7 3 to find a unit of eighty registered nurses in one division appro-
priate when the medical center employed more than 630 registered
nurses among its three divisions. 74 Concluding that congressional
concern with unit proliferation extended to unit scope as well as to
composition, the Second Circuit held the single-facility presumption
to be inapplicable in the health care context. 75
The Third Circuit has held on three occasions that Board approval
of units limited to boiler room operators1 7 and maintenance employ-
ees 177 was not consistent with "[t]he legislative history of the health
care amendments . . . [which] directed the Board to apply a standard
in this field that was not traditional." 7 8 In St. Vincent's Hospital v.
NLRB, 79 the court rejected the Board's certification of a unit of four
boiler operators and three maintenance workers in a hospital with 280
employees because its "mechanical reliance on traditional patterns
based on licensing, supervision, skills and employee joint activity
simply does not comply with congressional intent to treat this unique
field in a special manner."180
172. Id. at 34 n.2. The Second Circuit cited the following decisions as establishing
standards consistent with congressional intent: Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v.
NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d
965, 969-71 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22, 26-28 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 (1980); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404,
416 (9th Cir. 1979).
173. Because many health care institutions are multiple-facility complexes, the
issue arose whether a unit limited to a single facility of such an institution was
appropriate. In Saint Anthony Center, 220 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1975), the Board held
that single-facility units would be considered presumptively appropriate in the health
care field. Id. at 1011. The Board has reasoned that the congressional directive is
inapplicable to questions of unit scope because work disruptions in one facility would
not seriously interfere with the operations of the others. National G. South, Inc., 230
N.L.R.B. 976, 978 n.5 (1977). The Board has looked to the bargaining history,
employee interchange, geographic separation between facilities, and the degree of
centralization and control. Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Center, 235 N.L.R.B. 241
(1978); Samaritan Health Servs., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 629 (1978); Long Island Jewish-
Hillside Medical Center, 685 F.2d at 32.
174. 685 F.2d at 30-31.
175. Id. at 34. The Second Circuit does not follow this approach in cases outside
the health care industry. NLRB v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 675 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir.
1982).
176. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966 (3d Cir. 1979); Memorial
Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976).
177. St. Vincent's Hosp., 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977).
178. Id. at 592.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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In Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, 181 the Third Circuit
refused to enforce the Board's grant of comity to a state agency
maintenance unit determination. 82 The court chastised the Board for
its failure to abide by the court's earlier holdings18 3 in Memorial
Hospital v. NLRB,' 84 which denied Board extension of comity where
the parties contested the determination, 185 and St. Vincent's Hospital.
The Third Circuit concluded, "it is in this court by virtue of its
responsibility as the statutory court of review of NLRB orders that
Congress has vested a superior power for the interpretation of the
congressional mandate." 18 6 The court noted that the Board, in adopt-
ing the industrial American Cyanamid Co. 87 test to determine the
appropriateness of maintenance units in health care, had not applied
the proper standard because it did not consider the effect of unit
fragmentation and the public interest.'88
The Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining
order for a registered nurses' unit in NLRB v. Frederick Memorial
Hospital, 89 because of the Board's exclusive reliance on the traditional
community of interest test, and its failure to explain how its decision
implemented the congressional admonition. 90 The court conceded,
however, that had it been an industrial dispute, the Board's ruling
would have remained undisturbed. 19'
In NLRB v. West Suburban Hospital,19 2 the Seventh Circuit criti-
cized the Board for exclusively relying on a community of interest
analysis and for giving "mere lip-service mention" to the congressional
directive. '1a Finding that the Board's certification of a maintenance
unit was in violation of legislative intent, the court denied enforce-
ment. 194 Similarly, in Mary Thompson Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 115 the
Board's determination that four stationary engineers constituted an
181. 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
182. Id. at 966, 967.
183. Id. at 968.
184. 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976).
185. Id. at 367.
186. 608 F.2d at 970.
187. See note 96 supra.
188. 608 F.2d at 971.
189. 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982).
190. Id. at 194, 195.
191. Id. at 193 (dicta).
192. 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978).
193. Id. at 216.
194. Id.
195. 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980).
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appropriate unit prompted the Seventh Circuit to chastise the Board
for failing to even give "lip-service" to the directive, despite the clear
language in West Suburban Hospital.
96
Court decisions demonstrate a deep concern that the Board articu-
late the manner in which it implements the congressional directive. In
this respect, the circuits are in accord. Nevertheless, despite the gen-
eral consensus that the Board must consider the public interest in its
unit determinations, the courts are presently in disagreement over the
appropriate legal standard that should be employed in the health care
field.
V. A Suggested Approach: Adoption of the Disparity of Interest Test
A review of Board decisions reveals that the Board has not actively
applied the nonproliferation principle in all areas of its health care
determinations. Considering the Board's most recent pronouncement
in St. Francis Hospital,197 together with other decisions requiring
separate representation in "exceptional" circumstances, 8 one may
conclude that the Board has approved an equal number of units in the
health care industry as in the industrial sphere. 99 This result, more-
over, constitutes the undue proliferation of bargaining units which
Congress directed the Board to prevent. Thus, the circuit court posi-
tion, that the Board must begin to explicitly consider the congressional
mandate in its decision-making, merits serious attention.
The Second Circuit's formulation of the appropriate legal standard
in Trustees of the Masonic Hall200 retains the traditional unit criteria
which the Board has employed in its health care determinations. The
use of the community of interest test by the Board, however, has in
specific instances resulted in undue proliferation or has failed to dem-
onstrate its consideration of the public interest. 20 Furthermore, de-
spite urging by the Second Circuit that the Board incorporate a bal-
ancing approach in its decision-making, the Board has not yet
demonstrated its willingness to do so.
196. The court stated, "[s]uch flagrant disregard of judicial precedent must not
continue. Not only is the Board obligated under the principles of stare decisis to
follow this court's decision in West Suburban, but it also owes deference to the other
courts of appeals which have ruled on this issue." Id. at 864.
.197. See notes 97-107 supra and accompanying text.
198. See notes 108-12 supra and accompanying text.
199. See Bumpass, supra note,53, at 903.
200. See notes 161-66 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 74-196 supra and accompanying text; Trustees of the Masonic Hall,
699 F.2d 626, 635 (2d Cir. 1983).
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A new approach, therefore, tailored to the special needs of the
health care field may provide the best alternative for this industry.
The disparity of interest test, advocated by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, 20 2 offers such an alternative. It would fulfill the congressio-
nal intent of avoiding unit proliferation by granting approval only
where it is clear that the requesting employees are entitled to separate
representation because of their distinctive interests. The party seeking
a narrower unit would carry the burden of establishing that the
conditions of employment were so dissimilar that fair representation
could only be achieved through a separate unit. 20 3
The disparity of interest test, moreover, would insure that the
Board retained its discretion in unit determinations as it neither cre-
ates presumptions nor places limitations on unit number or composi-
tion.2 0 4 Contrary to the view recently expressed by the Second Cir-
cuit, 20 5 this test is not a rigid one, but rather a pragmatic approach
which is premised on the need to avoid unit proliferation. It seeks to
harmonize that goal with employee rights by providing that those
with dissimilar interests will be granted separate representation.
The 1974 amendments have had an important impact on the char-
acter of unionization in health care. 20 6 The more specialized craft
unions have been obliged to make internal changes and new affilia-
tions207 while the larger unions have emerged to dominate the field. 20 8
Inasmuch as this has resulted in fewer choices for health care workers,
it does not mean that their representation has been less effective. 209
202. See notes 128-56 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 135 supra.
204. Adopting the disparity of interest test, former Chairman Van De Water
concluded in St. Francis Hospital that only two units were presumptively appropri-
ate in the health care industry. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153, 1167
(1982). This approach of limiting health care units to those consisting of either
professionals or nonprofessionals, however, would seriously infringe on the Board's
discretion. Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1159 n.12. Member Hunter, who declined to join in
this approach, strikes the proper balance by not restricting the number of appropri-
ate units. Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1174 n.126.
205. In Trustees of the Masonic Hall v. NLRB, the court concluded that the
disparity of interest test was a rigid approach which would lead to wall-to-wall units
in the health care industry. 699 F.2d 626, 641 (2d Cir. 1983). This view ignores the
fact that smaller units may be established when the test is met. See St. Francis, 265
N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1167 n.89 (Van De Water, C., dissenting).
206. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT, supra note 13, at 284.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 288.
209. Id. at 289.
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The duty of fair representation is binding on all bargaining agents
regardless of unit size. 210 Broader units do signify, however, fewer
contracts to negotiate and administer and less chance of disruption in
health care delivery. 211 Thus, the disparity of interest test represents a
vehicle to balance the important goals of labor stability and employee
free choice.
VI. Conclusion
The 1974 amendments to the Act were passed by Congress to extend
its coverage to nonprofit hospital employees and to protect the public
interest. This Comment has traced the legislative history of the
amendments and highlighted the congressional concern with the
unique attributes of the health care industry. It has argued that the
congressional directive to avoid unit proliferation has not been satis-
fied by the Board's traditional community of interest approach which
tends to create narrow bargaining units in some instances. Instead,
this Comment has proposed that the disparity of interest test should be
adopted by the Board in its unit determinations in the health field. By
focusing on the disparate interests rather than similar interests among
a group of employees, the Board will achieve broader units as in-
tended by Congress.
Mary Esquivel Sciarra
210. See note 135 supra.
211. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT, supra note 13, at 289-90.
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